Re: A peculiar (and mathematical) argument for Lucan priority and Matthean posteriority.
Posted: Thu Apr 15, 2021 2:23 am
And significance in frequrentist statistics means that there is probably something to be explained, not that any particular explanation of it is probably correct.but I agree that this is a good minimum standard for significance
Nobody thinks that Luke chopped up the sayings, placed them in a jar, blindfolded himself and drew them one-by-one without replacement to copy into his gospel. That, and only that and its restatements, is what a low probability of occuring by chance eliminates.
What you get for calculating anything approximating that is some objective (or at least model-based) assurance that you aren't wasting your time pursuing a coincidence beyond your amply justified but subjective near-certainty that the gospels didn't arise by chance. You also get heuristic reassurance that the available data is commensurate with the effect size. That's important in this domain, because we - well, you - probably aren't getting any more data soon.
That is what you need to show.there being no inherent reason for that to be the case
At some level of abstraction, your problem stems from the alternative pair of uncertain hypotheses:
There is no good reason why Luke would preserve Matthew's order. OR
There is such a reason if Luke knew Matthew's order.
I get that the first alternative is your a priori but subjective and apprarently near-certain belief. (Seriously? You are as confident of this as you are that Luke didn't pull his order out of a jar?)
This is unlike "Luke used a randomizing device," whose probability we know to be nearly zero (as amusing as it is to revisit high school level combinatorics to calculate some close approximation to what we all already know the true value to be, and have no dispute about.)
If you really have that level of confidence that there is no reason for Luke to have preserved Matthew's order, then you really are done. Confidence maxes at certainty: no evidence can much increase your confidence (because there is no much higher confidence to arrive at) and your beliefs imply similar near-certainty that no contrary evidence will ever much decrease your confidence (not a guarantee, of course, but it is what your beliefs imply about what you expect if you are as confident as you appear that the key hypothesis can simply be assumed to be true).
Anyway, I sense my participation in the thread is unwelcome, so i won't trouble you further.