I've noted that Kok doesn't think that Mark's lack of 'order' means chronological order. I've argued that the way our canon is ordered - in four books - is deemed to be the 'right order' by the founder of our religion. Here's another example in Against Marcion:
Yes, but our god,' the Marcionites rejoin, 'though not revealed from the beginning, or by virtue of any creation, yet has by his own self been revealed in Christ Jesus.' One of my books will have reference to Christ and all that he stands for: for the divisions of our subject have to be kept distinct, so as to receive more complete and orderly treatment (quo plenius et ordinatius retractentur). (1.19)
And then again in chapter 23:
how can that secondary rationality be credited to a goodness which lacks the primary, having no man of its own, and on this account again is even defective? And being defective through having no man of its own, how can it have overflowed into a man not its own? Put in evidence that primary rationality, and then you may lay claim to the secondary. No object, outside its due order, can be claimed as rational: far less can rationality itself in any person be deprived of its due order. Even suppose there could be a rationality of goodness, which began at the second degree, that in respect of the stranger, not even this second degree could be firmly based upon rationality (Exhibe principalem rationem, et tunc vindica sequentem. Nulla res sine ordine rationalis potest vindicari, tanto abest ut ratio ipsa in aliquo ordinem amittat. Sit nunc et a secundo gradu incipiens ratio bonitatis, in extraneum scilicet, nec secundus illi gradus ratione constabit alio modo destructus).
Again in 24:
As a god is both eternal and rational, no less, I suppose, is he perfect in all things: for, Ye shall be perfect, as is your Father who is in heaven. Produce the evidence of <your god's> goodness being perfect. Although it is surely enough imperfect, as it is seen to be neither natural nor rational, I shall next expose it by a different approach. It is now not even imperfect, but altogether less than that, defective and impoverished, less than the total of the calls upon it, seeing it is not in evidence among all(Etsi de imperfecta satis constat, quae neque naturalis invenitur neque rationalis, nunc et alio ordine traducetur; nec iam imperfecta, immo et defecta, exigua et exhausta, minor numero materiarum suarum, quae non in omnibus exhibetur
Again in 2.3:
Exempt then both from order of beginning and from measure of time, (God's goodness) must be accounted of age unmeasurable and without end. Nor can it be reckoned makeshift or adventitious or occasional, since it has no point from which it can be reckoned, no time of any sort (Atque ita carens et ordine initii et modo temporis de immensa et interminabili aetate censebitur): but it must be taken to be eternal, ingenerate in God, and everlasting, and on that account worthy of God. From the first then it puts to shame the goodness of Marcion's god, which is subsequent not only to the Creator's beginnings and times, but even to his malice—if indeed it is possible that malice has ever been a function of goodness.
In 2.5:
So too could you find it in the Creator's later laws: he sets before man good and evil, life and death: for that whole course of discipline laid down in precepts (sed nec alias totum ordinem disciplinae per praecepta dispositum), in which God warns and threatens and exhorts, assumes through- out that man is possessed of both liberty and initiative, either to submit or to despise.
2.10
He began to sin when he sowed the seed of sin, and so from then onwards was engaged in the multitude of his merchandise, his wickedness, the full measure of his transgressions: for he also, being a spirit, was no less (than the man) created with freedom of choice. Anything so near to himself God cannot but have established in freedom of that sort (Nihil enim deus proximum sibi non libertate eiusmodi ordinasset).
2:12
So then since, goodness and justice are in such close association and agreement that the separation of one from the other is inconceivable, how can you dare to postulate an opposition between two gods, counting out separately on the one side a good god and on the other side a just one? Goodness is firmly established where justice also is. Since the beginning then the Creator is both good and just, both just and good. Both qualities came into evidence at the same time. His goodness constructed the world, his justice regulated it, since it even then judged that the world must be fashioned of good <materials>: thus did judgement take counsel with goodness. It was by an act of justice that separation was decreed between light and darkness, between day and night, between heaven and earth, between the water above and the water below, between the gathering together of the sea and the building up of the dry land, between the greater lights and the lesser, between those of the day and those of the night, between male and female, between the tree of knowledge of death and of life, between the world and paradise, between animals born in the water and animals born on land.1 As soon as goodness had conceived them all, justice distinguished between them. By an act of justice this whole was established and set in order (Totum hoc iudicato dispositum et ordinatum est). Every position and every situation of the heavenly bodies, the activities, motions, and conjunctions, the risings and settings, of each one of them, are the Creator's judgements.
2.14
They are , no doubt , evil to those by whom they are endured , but still on their own account good , as being just and defensive of good and hostile to sin . In this respect they are , moreover , worthy of God (atque in hoc ordine deo digna).
2.17
These facts thus expounded show how God's whole activity as judge (Haec ita dispecta totum ordinem dei iudicis operarium) is the artificer and, to put it more correctly, the protector of his all-embracing and supreme goodness. The Marcionites refuse to admit in that same God the presence of this goodness, clear of judicial sentiments, and in its own state unadulterated.
2.19
It is enough for the present that, without figurative meaning, it was putting man under obligation to God: and therefore none have any right to complain, except such as take no pleasure in God's service. So as to carry further this good gift, not burden, of the law, that same goodness of God has also appointed prophets ( legis adiuvandum etiam prophetas eadem bonitas dei ordinavit) who teach of godly conduct—to remove wickedness from the soul,b to learn to do well, to seek judgement, to judge for the fatherless and maintain the cause of the widow, to love requests (for God's guidance), to flee from association with the wicked, to let the afflicted go free, to break down the unjust accusation, to share one's bread with the hungry and take into one's house him that has no roof of his own—If thou seest the naked cover him, and despise not the kinsmen of thine own seedc—to keep one's tongue from evil, and one's lips that they speak no guile, to depart from evil and to do good, to seek peace ...
2.22
If the dependent of a wealthy man or a monarch, even though his patron is in need of nothing, offers him some trivial gift, will the smallness and cheapness of the gift darken the countenance of that wealthy man or king? Will not rather the token of respect afford him pleasure? But if that dependent when his turn comes round offers him gifts (ordine suo offerat), whether voluntary or requisitioned, and performs the services due to a king, yet not out of true fidelity or of a pure heart, but a heart not fully intent upon the rest of his obligations
2.27
But seeing that you yourselves have already stated your belief that a god has dwelt in human shape and in all the rest of what belongs to man's estate (et in reliquo ordine humanae conditionis deversatum iam credidistis), you will assuredly not demand any further persuasion that God has in fact made himself conformable to human condition, but are confuted by virtue of your own creed.
ibid
How great then is your unreasonableness in the face of both one and the other of the Creator's courses of action (ordinem creatoris). You mark him down as a judge, yet the sternness which is natural to a judge in accordance with the demands of the cases before him you stigmatize as cruelty.
2.29
So Marcion's antitheses make it easier to explain how the Creator's order was by Christ rather refashioned than repudiated (Ita per antitheses facilius ostendi potest ordo creatoris a Christo refonnatus quam repercussus), restored rather than rejected: especially so when you make your good god exempt from every bitterness of feeling, and, in that case, from hostility to the Creator. If that is the case how can the antitheses prove he has been in opposition to one or another aspect of the Creator's character?
3.2
Now for my first line of attack. I suggest that he had no right to come so unexpectedly. For two reasons. First because he too was the son of his own god. Proper order (ordinis) required that father should tell of son's existence before son told of father's, and father bear witness to son before son bore witness to father.
3.2,3
And so it required preparatory work in order to be credible—preparatory work built upon foundations of previous intention and prior announcement. Only by being built up in this order could faith with good cause be imposed upon man by God, and shown towards God by man (quo ordine fides informata merito et homini indiceretur a deo et deo exhiberetur ab homine)—a faith which, since there was knowledge, might be required to believe because belief was a possibility, and in fact had learned to believe by virtue of that previous announcement.
There was no need, you say, for such an ordering of events (Non fuit, inquis, ordo eiusmodi necessarius), seeing that he would immediately by the evidence of miracles prove himself in actual fact both son and emissary, and the Christ of God. My answer will be that this form of proof by itself could never have provided satisfactory testimony to him, and in fact he himself subsequently discounted it.