Eusebius citing Maximus Prep. Ev. 7
'But I suppose you will meet my argument in this way, that the artist makes the art which is in the material substance out of the art which he has in himself. Now in answer to this I think it may fairly be said, that it is not produced even in the man out of any underlying art. For it is not possible to grant that the art exists independently by itself, since it is one of the accidents, and one of those things which have existence given to them at the moment when they are produced in a substance.
'For the man will exist even apart from his skill as an architect, but this will have no existence unless there be first a man. And hence we are compelled to say that it is the nature of the arts to be produced in men out of what is non-existent. If therefore we have now shown this to be so in the case of men, why was it not proper to say that God was able to make not only qualities but also substances out of what was non-existent? For the proof that it is possible for something to be made out of what is non-existent shows that this is the case with the substances also.
and
'But if evils are substances, and murder is an evil, murder will be a substance: yet surely murder is an action of some one, and so murder is not a substance. If however you mean that the agents are substances, I too agree. For example, a man who is a murderer, in respect of his being man is a substance: but the murder which he does is not a substance, but a work of the substance.
'So we say in one case that the man is evil, because of his committing murder, and in a contrary case that he is good, because of his doing good. And these names are attached to the substance in consequence of its accidents, which are not itself: for the substance is not murder, nor again adultery, or any of the like evils. But just as the grammarian is named from grammar, and the rhetorician from rhetoric, and the physician from the art of physic, though his substance is neither the art of physic nor yet rhetoric, nor grammar, but receives the name from its accidents, from which it seems fit to be so called, although it is neither one nor the other of them, in like manner it appears to me that the substance also acquires an additional name from what are thought to be evils, though it is neither of them.
'And in like manner if you imagine some other being in the mind as the cause of evils in men, I would have you consider that he also, inasmuch as he works in them and suggests the doing evil, is himself evil in consequence of what he does. For he too is said to be evil for this reason that he is the doer of evils. But the things which any one does are not himself, but his actions, from which he receives the name of being evil.
'For if we were to say that he himself is what he does, and if he does murders and adulteries and thefts and all the like, then he himself is these: and if he is himself these, and these gain real existence at the time of being done, and in ceasing to be done cease to exist, and it is by men that they are done----then the men must be the makers of themselves and the causes of their own being and ceasing to be.
'Whereas if you say that these are his actions, he has the character of being evil from what he does, not from what constitutes his substance. But we said that a man is called evil from the accidents pertaining to his substance, which are not the substance itself, as the physician from the art of physic.
'If then each man is evil in consequence of his actions, and if his actions receive a beginning of existence, then that man also began to be evil, and these evils too had a beginning. And if this is so, a man will not be without a beginning in evil, nor evils un-originate, because we say that they originate with him.'
“Finally, from so little sleeping and so much reading, his brain dried up and he went completely out of his mind.”
― Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote