Why Are Historicists So Certain That Jesus Existed?

[andrewcriddle]

This may possibly be a digression better ignored, but here goes anyway.

I think this thread may be confusing two issues:
issue 1/ why do historicists think that the existence of a historical Jesus is much more probable than the alternatives ?
Issue 2/ Does the belief that the existence of a historical Jesus is much more probable than the alternatives, justify positive assent to the existence of a historical Jesus ?

Discussing issue 1/ means trotting out yet again arguments on both sides that we have all heard repeatedly.

Discussing issue 2/ means becoming involved in a philosophical issue about the nature and justification of positive assent. See for example Newman Grammar of Assent The underlying issue is that (most) people give assent to various propositions, (the reality of anthropogenic global warming, the truth or falsity of claims concerning long ago misconduct by prominent living people, the approximate number of people killed in the early modern European witch hunt, the truth of the four color theorem, the basic truth of our memories, etc), of which they are not entitled to claim certain knowledge. (I have included some cases where experts in the field may be entitled to claim certain knowledge but most people assenting to the claim are not experts in any meaningful sense.) The issue is; when are we justified in giving positive assent to claims about which we lack certain knowledge ?

Andrew Criddle

[Paul the Uncertain]

andrew

It seems to me that the OP puzzle is a harder version of your issue #2: the expression of literal certainty about a contingent proposition, rather than "assent," or as some scholars of uncertainty call something closely related, "acceptance."

The issue is; when are we justified in giving positive assent to claims about which we lack certain knowledge ?

I would propose Isaac Levi's criterion of serious possibility as a basis, where "I am certain that X" would mean that "I estimate that the contrary of X is not seriously possible."

Apart from the intuitive sense of the phrase, that would entail that I do not bother to quantify how unlikely the contrary of X is. I estimate that its chances of being true are negligible, and justified by that estimate, I neglect it and its chances.

We might bear in mind that evidentiary interpretation is not the only justification of belief. You mentioned the four color theorem, which is a necessary truth, and has been shown to be such. I also may have purely prioristic grounds for confident belief, for example, which way my keys travel when I let go of them: down.

It is logically possible that there is an enoromous magnet over my head which would pull them up, but it is not seriously possible, and I neglect that without evidence about the whereabouts of the nearest sufficiently powerful magnet. An even more everyday example is coin tossing: I neglect the possibility that the coin will land on edge, although US coins (where I live) will stand on edge. I have zero evidence about the actual prospects of a tossed coin landing on edge, beyond an inability to recall ever having had the experience.

Hope that helps.

[andrewcriddle]

We might bear in mind that evidentiary interpretation is not the only justification of belief. You mentioned the four color theorem, which is a necessary truth, and has been shown to be such. I also may have purely prioristic grounds for confident belief, for example, which way my keys travel when I let go of them: down.

I mentioned the four color theorem because the demonstration that it is a necessary truth involves using a computer program.
It is impossible (so far) for a human to verify the proof without using a computer.
See http://www.ams.org/notices/200811/tx081101382p.pdf


Andrew Criddle

[Secret Alias]

I am not so sure my original post can be boiled down to that Andrew. The gospels that were passed along to us by our tradition, reflect the central doctrines of our tradition. That is to be expected given the fact that early Christians doctored their texts. The accusation that 'Christians' manipulated their textual tradition is as old as Celsus and Lucian but it certainly is epitomized by the problem of Marcion. If all traditions altered their texts to reflect their doctrines, then the certainty with which many scholars approach the historicity of Jesus is misguided. The likelihood is that there was one original gospel - whether that was Mark or Marcion is immaterial to the present discussion. Whatever that earliest gospel was that first gospel would serve as the best window to understand who Jesus was and whether or not he was originally conceived as a man or God or a little of both. But there is no way to determine whether or not the first gospel was Mark, Marcion or some other gospel. As such the historicity of Jesus is insoluble.

[Paul the Uncertain]

andrew

I take your point, but no specific role for human beings is required to establish the validity of a proof.

The four-color theorem's proof is interesting for its combination of foundational importance and the lack of human supervision when proving it, but general-purpose automated theorem provers are routine technology. A popular kind, so-called resolution theorem provers (searchable), are an undergraduate programming exercise, at least basic models.

That the resolution algorithm works is human-proven. That the algorithm has been properly implemented is, at least in principle, also provable. There is no rational basis for discriminating against silicon hardware on account of some nostalgic reverence for wetware.

Come with me if you want to live .

Secret

the certainty with which many scholars approach the historicity of Jesus is misguided.

Of course it is, but your question, Why do they have that certainty?, is still interesting.

[Secret Alias]

But it is interesting for the reasons that Andrew hints at - the basic question rooted in the problem of the disappearance of a lot of the earliest gospels tends to give way to general epistemological concerns. I must be simple-minded because I simply can't reconcile in my own head how anyone who becomes aware that so much early information has disappeared can have certainty that all that material fits within the subset of 'more of the same' with respect to information about early Christianity and Jesus. My sense would be we'd be very surprised by the Marcionite gospel, the gospel of Basilides, the gospel used by Clement of Alexandria, and the early gospel harmony of Justin. These gospels would not simply be reflections of the reality or culture that produced the canonical four.

[Paul the Uncertain]

Secret

I must be simple-minded because I simply can't reconcile in my own head how anyone who becomes aware that so much early information has disappeared can have certainty that all that material fits within the subset of 'more of the same' with respect to information about early Christianity and Jesus.

That's not simple minded at all.

It is a fact that there are two kinds of errors a "detector" can make:

- to detect something when there's nothing there to detect, and
- to fail to detect something when there is something there to detect

All any of us can do about that is to balance, to trade-off, our vulnerability to each of those two kinds of mistake. If we make fewer of one kind (be very skeptical, for instance), then we will make more of the other kind. Whatever balance we choose, we will make some mistakes anyway. There is no impersonally valid "right" balance, although many people seem to be very emotional about the balance they've chosen for themselves.

I think it is reasonable to say that the Historical Jesus Guild is more concerned to avoid failing to detect Jesus, for many reasons including the overwhelming prevalence of plain religious belief in the salvific Jesus among scholars.

Anyway, I think that's part of the answer to your question: the Guild would far rather detect what isn't there (Nobody ever burned in Hell for believing in a historical Jesus, nor missed tenure, either), than fail to detect what is there. "Certainty," whether they mean it literally or in some weaker practical sense, arises from flat denial that they have made a mistake-balancing choice, which rules out certainty because it is completely and impersonally unachievable.

[nili]

Perhaps the bulk of them are merely "so certain" that the existence of an historical Jesus is the more reasonable inference.

That said, it's interesting how the formulation of the question so effortlessly reflects a bias that seems to me not dissimilar to that found among some advocates of the minimalist camp in the field of so-called biblical archaeology.

[nili]

This may possibly be a digression better ignored, but here goes anyway.

I think this thread may be confusing two issues:
issue 1/ why do historicists think that the existence of a historical Jesus is much more probable than the alternatives ?
Issue 2/ Does the belief that the existence of a historical Jesus is much more probable than the alternatives, justify positive assent to the existence of a historical Jesus ?

Discussing issue 1/ means trotting out yet again arguments on both sides that we have all heard repeatedly.

Discussing issue 2/ means becoming involved in a philosophical issue about the nature and justification of positive assent. See for example Newman Grammar of Assent The underlying issue is that (most) people give assent to various propositions, (the reality of anthropogenic global warming, the truth or falsity of claims concerning long ago misconduct by prominent living people, the approximate number of people killed in the early modern European witch hunt, the truth of the four color theorem, the basic truth of our memories, etc), of which they are not entitled to claim certain knowledge. (I have included some cases where experts in the field may be entitled to claim certain knowledge but most people assenting to the claim are not experts in any meaningful sense.) The issue is; when are we justified in giving positive assent to claims about which we lack certain knowledge ?

Andrew Criddle

Excellent post. Thanks.

[robert j]

but rather in a very human-like physical body.

Literature does that.

Paul used the Jewish scriptures to construct his system, and his own backstory. This is, I think, among the most primitive of Christian materials, and part of the well-spring, the source, of subsequent Christian writings. A few examples:

The Pauline system was clear about its textual source ---

"That Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures, and that he was buried. And that he was raised the third day, according to the scriptures …” (1 Cor 15:3-4)

"… the proclamation of Jesus Christ, according to revelation of the mystery kept secret in times of the ages, but now having been made known through the prophetic scriptures, according to command of the eternal God. Leading to obedience of faith unto all the nations, having been made known the only wise God through Jesus Christ …” (Rom 16:25-27)

For whatever was written in the past (προεγράφη) was all written for our instruction, so that through endurance and through the encouragement of the Scriptures, we might have hope.” (Romans 15:4)

“Oh foolish Galatians, who has bewitched you, before whose eyes it was written in the past (προεγράφη) Jesus Christ having been staked”. (Gal 3:1)

Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, having become a curse for us; for it has been written: "Cursed is everyone hanging on a tree". (Galatians 3:13, from Deuteronomy 21:23)

…that in us you may learn, not beyond what has been written. (1 Corinthians 4:6)

Paul used “... has been written” 31 times, all referring to the Jewish scriptures.