The best case for Jesus's historicity: Mark Craig

[Ben C. Smith]

Neil, I am wondering what you would make of the following example of historical inquiry.

In note 34 on page 28 of Ptolemy's Geography, J. L. Berggren writes:

"Siatoutanda" (Geography 2.11), perhaps from the phrase, "The rebels having departed to ensure their safety (ad sua tutanda)" (Tacitus, Ann{als} 4.73, Loeb 4.129).

He goes on to attribute this idea to H. Müller in 1837. Basically, the proposition is that Ptolemy's place name Siatoutanda, otherwise unknown, is actually a mistake based upon his having misread Tacitus' description of a trip "to ensure their safety" (ad sua tutanda) as a trip "to Suatutanda" (ad Suatutanda), with Ptolemy deducing from geographical context the approximate location of the town.

There is no hard evidence to support this idea: no archaeological remains (which would not be expected anyway if the town's name is a mistake), no ancient testimony to the effect that Ptolemy misread Tacitus here, no inscriptions to support the claim. It is just a very observant literary idea with very real historical consequences (that Ptolemy had read Tacitus, for one thing; that such a town never actually existed, for another).

Is this, in your opinion, good history? There is no way it measures up to anything resembling the standards of proof required in a courtroom (standards which historians admit are too stringent for the pursuit of ancient history anyway, though I am speaking of American law courts here, and things may be different in other countries); I doubt it would even measure up to standards of proof for plagiarism. Is it a good idea, in your judgment, for historians to float these kinds of ideas? Does it depend upon them admitting the speculative nature of the idea (thus implying that Jesus historians might well do the same)? Or should Müller have kept mum about even the very possibility until he had ironclad proof?

(Full disclosure: I have not read every single post on this thread, and have found the ones I have read, even early on when I had not skipped any yet, pretty confusing at times.)

[neilgodfrey]

Neil, I am wondering what you would make of the following example of historical inquiry.

In note 34 on page 28 of Ptolemy's Geography, J. L. Berggren writes:

"Siatoutanda" (Geography 2.11), perhaps from the phrase, "The rebels having departed to ensure their safety (ad sua tutanda)" (Tacitus, Ann{als} 4.73, Loeb 4.129).

He goes on to attribute this idea to H. Müller in 1837. Basically, the proposition is that Ptolemy's place name Siatoutanda, otherwise unknown, is actually a mistake based upon his having misread Tacitus' description of a trip "to ensure their safety" (ad sua tutanda) as a trip "to Suatutanda" (ad Suatutanda), with Ptolemy deducing from geographical context the approximate location of the town.

There is no hard evidence to support this idea: no archaeological remains (which would not be expected anyway if the town's name is a mistake), no ancient testimony to the effect that Ptolemy misread Tacitus here, no inscriptions to support the claim. It is just a very observant literary idea with very real historical consequences (that Ptolemy had read Tacitus, for one thing; that such a town never actually existed, for another).

Is this, in your opinion, good history?

There is some confusion about the meaning of the word "history", here. What you have described is a textual problem. It is not "history" per se. For a "history" to be written about that particular event the historian would have to explain the state of the evidence and the problem facing us regarding the sources.

There is no way it measures up to anything resembling the standards of proof required in a courtroom (standards which historians admit are too stringent for the pursuit of ancient history anyway, though I am speaking of American law courts here, and things may be different in other countries);

I don't know if I understand the problem. What you present, as I understand it, is not a "historical" problem but a textual problem.

If the source data is ambiguous or uncertain, then that needs to be taken into account, obviously. It would be unprofessional to simply gallop off with one interpretation blithely ignoring the uncertainty in the source data.

Is it a good idea, in your judgment, for historians to float these kinds of ideas? Does it depend upon them admitting the speculative nature of the idea (thus implying that Jesus historians might well do the same)? Or should Müller have kept mum about even the very possibility until he had ironclad proof?

It sounds like you are asking if we should present black and white arguments if the data does not allow us to do that. Obviously not.

If we don't know, we don't know. If we are not sure, we are not sure. I don't see what the problem is.

[Ben C. Smith]

I don't know if I understand the problem. What you present, as I understand it, is not a "historical" problem but a textual problem.

The (potential) solution to the problem has historical consequences. It implies, for instance, that one text preceded the other. It also implies that such-and-such a town never existed.

It sounds like you are asking if we should present black and white arguments if the data does not allow us to do that.

No, I am asking whether such ideas ought to be floated in the first place, in your judgment. Is it okay, to your mind, for an historian to make a suggestion based on evidence which he or she admits falls short of his or her normal standards? Or would that be an example of what you are calling being "free to imagine whatever" one likes? Would that be, IOW, an example of an historian breaking what you are calling "the rules of inquiry" for history?

To return to one of the issues on this thread, would it upset you if a Jesus scholar suggested that Jesus existed, based on limited and insufficient evidence, if he or she admitted that the evidence is not as clear-cut as it is for some other figures? Would you think the less of such a person for having ventured forth such an opinion, even with the caveat?

If we don't know, we don't know. If we are not sure, we are not sure. I don't see what the problem is.

There is no problem with that statement. But that is not what I am asking. See above.

[neilgodfrey]

I don't know if the following is of any interest or point to anyone, or if it needs to be said at all. Maybe it doesn't. But just in case ......

History does not exist "out there". History does not have any reality independent of what we think it is.

History is something that is constructed, made up (to put it crudely) by historians. History is not something that has some real existence that is just waiting to be discovered and mapped for readers, the way explorers once discovered and mapped new lands. The past is past. It no longer exists.

All historians have is archival documents, manuscripts, stone monuments, architectural remains, etc. History has be constructed from an interpretation of these sources. Each historian's perspective is inevitably going to vary.

History is not a "reality" that exists independently like a continental land mass that is just waiting to be discovered and mapped. History is imagined by researchers as they pore through data.

[neilgodfrey]

I don't know if I understand the problem. What you present, as I understand it, is not a "historical" problem but a textual problem.

The (potential) solution to the problem has historical consequences. It implies, for instance, that one text preceded the other. It also implies that such-and-such a town never existed.

It sounds like you are asking if we should present black and white arguments if the data does not allow us to do that.

No, I am asking whether such ideas ought to be floated in the first place, in your judgment. Is it okay, to your mind, for an historian to make a suggestion based on evidence which he or she admits falls short of his or her normal standards? Or would that be an example of what you are calling being "free to imagine whatever" one likes? Would that be, IOW, an example of an historian breaking what you are calling "the rules of inquiry" for history?

To return to one of the issues on this thread, would it upset you if a Jesus scholar suggested that Jesus existed, based on limited and insufficient evidence, if he or she admitted that the evidence is not as clear-cut as it is for some other figures? Would you think the less of such a person for having ventured forth such an opinion, even with the caveat?

If we don't know, we don't know. If we are not sure, we are not sure. I don't see what the problem is.

There is no problem with that statement. But that is not what I am asking. See above.

That final statement is my answer to your question. If we don't know we don't know.

Sure it makes a difference to one historian's historical reconstruction if she takes one interpretation of the data that another historian thinks is based on a textual mistake. If we don't know, or there is some doubt, then we don't know, or there is some doubt.

You will have to tell me what you mean by "history" if you don't think that answers your question. Perhaps we have different notions of what the word means.

[neilgodfrey]

Or would that be an example of what you are calling being "free to imagine whatever" one likes? Would that be, IOW, an example of an historian breaking what you are calling "the rules of inquiry" for history?

The "free to imagine whatever" scenario is directed to Paul who, as far as I can understand, seems to go way beyond any notion of what most historians would consider valid reasoning from the evidence.

By "rules of inquiry" I mean nothing other than what are the normal logical processes we all use everyday for establishing what is certain as distinct from what is not certain. I am assuming one's idea of "certainty" is base on evidence and not prejudice.

I am assuming that the techniques of establishing a case against someone for a crime, say, are basically similar to the techniques for establishing who pinched my last beer from the fridge, or what caused my window to be broken, or why someone placed a certain statue of an event commemorated in a certain year in the park, or who is the rightful claimant of some particular lost property, or if my loveable innocent baby-child was telling me a lie.

[Ben C. Smith]

You will have to tell me what you mean by "history" if you don't think that answers your question. Perhaps we have different notions of what the word means.

History, for my purposes here, means the attempt, by means of research or inquiry (ἱστορέω = to inquire, examine, observe), to determine in the first place what did or did not actually happen in the past (especially as described in written documents; hence the application of the term "prehistory" to the time before writing was invented), and in the second place what those events mean(t), or how to explain them. (Did Hannibal cross the Alps? What happened to the crew of the Mary Celeste? What was the actual identity of the criminal known as Jack the Ripper? Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor? Why did Rome fall?)

Is this a controversial definition for you, or are you fine with it?

I am assuming that the techniques of establishing a case against someone for a crime, say, are basically similar to the techniques for establishing who pinched my last beer from the fridge, or what caused my window to be broken, or why someone placed a certain statue of an event commemorated in a certain year in the park, or who is the rightful claimant of some particular lost property, or if my loveable innocent baby-child was telling me a lie.

I do not know how the law works in Australia, but here in the US the standards, as I understand them, for gaining a conviction against a purported criminal (in a criminal court, not in a civil court) are vastly different than the standards for virtually any kind of free inquiry. In a free inquiry, who shoulders the burden of proof would depend upon the nature of the case. In courts of law, the prosecutor always shoulders the burden of proof, no matter what. It is considered better to let the guilty go free than to punish the innocent, a sentiment often expressed as "innocent until proven guilty" or the like. While a conviction definitely means that the person ought to be considered guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, an acquittal is in no way a stamp of innocence; an acquittal may simply mean that there was not enough sure proof to convict, nothing more; it may also mean that some kind of technicality interfered with securing a conviction. Testimony against the defendant is often subject to the notion of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, meaning that if the witness is impeachable in one respect he or she may well be considered impeachable in all respects (this being just another example of preferring to let the guilty go free than to punish the innocent).

None of these specific constraints on jurisprudence applies to the historian, who is free to accuse Nero of fiddling while Rome burned without any consequence to Nero, since he is dead. The stakes are lower; and the inquiry may genuinely be free, with neither side ("he fiddled" versus "he did not fiddle") automatically bearing the burden of proof.

[neilgodfrey]

Ben, I simply mean that the historian needs to rely upon the data. Full stop. Does your question go beyond that? Is that a problematic statement to you?

(It seems to be a problematic proposition for Paul (to the extent that I think I understand Paul's arguments) but I did not think anyone else would be puzzled by it.)

[neilgodfrey]

History, for my purposes here, means the attempt, by means of research or inquiry (ἱστορέω = to inquire, examine, observe), to determine in the first place what did or did not actually happen in the past (especially as described in written documents; hence the application of the term "prehistory" to the time before writing was invented), and in the second place what those events mean(t), or how to explain them. (Did Hannibal cross the Alps? What happened to the crew of the Mary Celeste? What was the actual identity of the criminal known as Jack the Ripper? Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor? Why did Rome fall?)

You have two different types of explanation of what is "history" here. One is "what happened" and the second is "how does one explain what happened".

The first ought to be uncontroversial -- if it is grounded in uncontroversial data.

If you have data that is open to question, such as you presented earlier, then you tailor your account of what happened in proportion to the problem that your earlier issue demands.

What is the problem? If the data does not enable us to know, then we don't know. That's my point. We don't go beyond what we can know -- at least if we are reasonably professional/responsible.

I am not interested in discussing the second question and do not see its relevance in the context of "Jesus's historicity".

[Ben C. Smith]

History, for my purposes here, means the attempt, by means of research or inquiry (ἱστορέω = to inquire, examine, observe), to determine in the first place what did or did not actually happen in the past (especially as described in written documents; hence the application of the term "prehistory" to the time before writing was invented), and in the second place what those events mean(t), or how to explain them. (Did Hannibal cross the Alps? What happened to the crew of the Mary Celeste? What was the actual identity of the criminal known as Jack the Ripper? Why did Japan attack Pearl Harbor? Why did Rome fall?)

You have two different types of explanation of what is "history" here. One is "what happened" and the second is "how does one explain what happened".

That is correct. History is both. Both are history.

The first ought to be uncontroversial -- if it is grounded in uncontroversial data.

The first... definition that I gave? If so, how does the very definition of the word "history" depend on how uncontroversial the data is? And what data? Do you mean the data that one uses in order to argue for certain historical propositions? You may be confusing the definition of the word "history" with a view to how history ought to be conducted. But that would be a fallacy. The definition is independent of such particulars.

I am not interested in discussing the second question and do not see its relevance in the context of "Jesus's historicity".

It would come up, for example, in the matter of how to explain the origin of Christianity. A scenario in which Jesus had a hand in starting the whole affair will necessarily look at least somewhat different from a scenario in which Jesus did not even exist. Both propositions (that Christianity has zero grounding in an historical Jesus, whether such existed or not, and that Christianity does find its origins in something said or done by Jesus) would fall under the umbrella of historical study.